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Team Games Optimality Conditions of
Distributed Stochastic Differential Decision
Systems with Decentralized Noisy
Information Structures
Charalambos D. Charalambous and Nasir U. Ahmed
Abstract
We consider a team game reward, and we derive a stochastic Pontryagin’s maximum princi-
ple for distributed stochastic differential systems with decentralized noisy information structures. Our
methodology utilizes the semi martingale representation theorem, variational methods, and backward
stochastic differential equations. Furthermore, we derive necessary and sufficient optimality conditions
that characterize team and person-by-person optimality of decentralized strategies.
Finally, we apply the stochastic maximum principle to several examples from the application areas
of communications, filtering and control.
Index Terms. Team Games, Distributed Systems, Decentralized, Optimality Conditions, Maxi-
mum Principle.
I. INTRODUCTION
We derive necessary and sufficient team game optimality conditions for distributed stochastic
differential systems with decentralized noisy information structures. For noiseless information
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2structures, analogous optimality conditions are derived recently in [1] utilizing the representation
of Hilbert space semi martingales and the stochastic Pontryagin’s maximum principle of partially
observed stochastic differential systems developed in [2]. However, the results obtained in [1]
for decentralized noiseless information structures are not necessarily applicable to decentralized
noisy information structures. In fact, there are certain technicalities that must be addressed
when dealing with noisy information structures, which are inherited from the centralized fully
observable versus partially observable stochastic optimal control [3]–[12]. The main underlying
assumption for centralized information structures, is that the acquisition of the information is
centralized or the information acquired at different locations is communicated to each decision
maker or control.
When the system model consist of multiple decision makers, and the acquisition of information
and its processing is decentralized or shared among several locations, then the different decision
makers actions are based on different information [13]. We call the information available for such
decisions, ”decentralized information structures or patterns” [14], [15]. When the system model
is dynamic, consisting of an interconnection of at least two subsystems, and the decisions are
based on decentralized information structures, we call the overall system a ”distributed system
with decentralized information structures”.
Over the years several specific forms of decentralized information structures are analyzed
mostly in discrete-time [13]–[25], and more recently [26]–[34]. However, at this stage the only
systematic framework addressing optimality conditions for distributed systems with decentralized
information structures is the one reported in [1] for decentralized noiseless information structures.
In this paper, we consider a team game reward [22], [25], [35]–[37], and we derive necessary
and sufficient optimality conditions for distributed stochastic differential systems with decentral-
ized noisy information structures. Our methodology utilizes the semi martingale representation
theorem, variational methods, and generalizes the concepts utilized in [1], [2] to derive optimality
conditions for nonlinear stochastic distributed systems with decentralized noiseless information
structures. From the practical point of view, the results of this part give optimality conditions
in terms of forward and backward stochastic differential equations, and a Hamiltonian, called
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3”Hamiltonian System of Equations”, which we use to compute the optimal decentralized decision
strategies of several examples from the application areas of communications and control.
The specific objectives of this paper are the following.
(a) Derive team games Pontryagin’s stochastic minimum principle (necessary conditions of
optimality) for distributed stochastic systems with decentralized noisy information structures;
(b) Introduce assumptions so that the necessary conditions of optimality in (a) are also
sufficient, and relate the optimality conditions to person-by-person optimality conditions;
(c) Apply the stochastic minimum principle to several examples from the application areas of
communication and control.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II we we formulate the distributed
stochastic system with decentralized information structures. In Section III, we introduce the
variational equation and discuss its application in decentralized filtering and control. Section IV
is devoted to the development of stochastic optimality conditions for team games with decen-
tralized information structures, consisting of necessary and sufficient conditions of optimality. In
Section V we apply the minimum principle to various examples. The paper is concluded with
some comments on possible extensions of our results.
II. DISTRIBUTED STOCHASTIC DIFFERENTIAL TEAM GAMES
In this section we introduce the mathematical formulation of distributed stochastic differential
systems, the noisy information structures available to the decision makers, and the definitions of
collaborative decisions via team game optimality and person-by-person optimality. Although, the
stochastic differential systems are driven by the Decision Makers (DMs) actions, our analysis
includes unforced stochastic differential systems modeling distributed estimation. Therefeore, the
term ”decision maker” is used for distributed control as well as distributed estimation.
The formulation presupposes a fixed probability space with filtration,
(
Ω,F, {F0,t : t ∈
[0, T ]},P
)
satisfying the usual conditions, that is, (Ω,F,P) is complete, F0,0 contains all P-
null sets in F. Throughout we assume that all filtrations are right continuous and complete [38].
Define FT
△
= {F0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]}.
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4In our derivations we make extensive use of the following spaces. Let L2FT ([0, T ],R
n) ⊂ L2(Ω×
[0, T ], dP× dt,Rn) ≡ L2([0, T ], L2(Ω,Rn)) denote the space of FT−adapted random processes
{z(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]} such that
E
∫
[0,T ]
|z(t)|2Rndt <∞,
which is a sub-Hilbert space of L2([0, T ], L2(Ω,Rn)). Similarly, let L2FT ([0, T ],L(R
m,Rn)) ⊂
L2([0, T ], L2(Ω,L(Rm,Rn))) denote the space of FT−adapted n × m matrix valued random
processes {Σ(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]} such that
E
∫
[0,T ]
|Σ(t)|2L(Rm,Rn)dt
△
= E
∫
[0,T ]
tr(Σ∗(t)Σ(t))dt <∞.
A. Distributed Stochastic System
Next, we introduce the mathematical formulation of the stochastic system. On the fixed
probability space
(
Ω,F, {F0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]},P
)
we are given a distributed stochastic dynamical
decision system. It consists of an interconnection of N subsystems, and each subsystem i has,
state space Rni , DM action space Ai ⊂ Rdi , an exogenous state noise space Wi △= Rmi , an
exogenous measurement noise space Bi △= Rki , and initial state xi(0) = xi0, defined by
(S1) xi(0) = xi0: an Rni-valued Random Variable;
(S2) {W i(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]}: an Rmi-valued standard Brownian motion which models the exogenous
state noise, adapted to FT , independent of xi(0);
(S3) {Bi(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]}: an Rki-valued standard Brownian motion which models the exogenous
measurement noise, adapted to FT , independent of {W i(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]}.
The DM {ui : i ∈ ZN} take values in closed convex subsets of metric spaces {(Mi, d) : i ∈ ZN}.
The decentralized partial information structure available to DM ui is generated by noisy obser-
vation
yi(t) =
∫ t
0
hi(s, x1(s), . . . xN (s), y1(s), . . . yN(s))ds+
∫ t
0
Di,
1
2 (s)dBi(s), t ∈ [0, T ], ∀i ∈ ZN , (1)
where xi ∈ Rni is the state of subsystem i for i = 1, . . . , N . Notice that (1) models a channel
with memory and feedback. Each subsystem is described by finite dimensional coupled stochastic
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5differential equations as follows.
dxi(t) =f i(t, xi(t), uit)dt+ σ
i(t, xi(t), uit)dW
i(t) +
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
f ij(t, xj(t), ujt)dt
+
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
σij(t, xj(t), ujt)dW
j(t), xi(0) = xi0, t ∈ (0, T ], ∀i ∈ ZN . (2)
For decentralized communication and filtering applications the right side of (2) is independent
of the DMs ui, i = 1, . . . , N .
Since we considered a strong strong formulation, we define the filtration FT
△
= {F0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]}
as follows. Introduce the σ-algebras
Fi0,t
△
= σ
{
(xi(0),W i(s), Bi(s)) : 0 ≤ s ≤ t
}
, Gy
i,u
0,t
△
= σ
{
yi(s) : 0 ≤ s ≤ t
}
, t ∈ [0, T ], i = 1, . . . , N,
and the minimum σ− algebras generated by these as follows
F0,t
△
=
N∨
i=1
Fi0,t, G
yu
0,t
△
=
N∨
i=1
Gy
i,u
0,t , t ∈ [0, T ].
Next, we introduce the admissible sets of decentralized decision strategies considered in this
paper.
(FIS): Feedback Information Structures. Let Gyi,uT
△
= {Gy
i,u
0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]} ⊂ {F0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]}
denote the information available to DM i, ∀i ∈ ZN . The admissible set of decentralized
feedback strategies for DM i is defined by
Uy
i,u
[0, T ]
△
=
{
ui ∈ L2
G
yi,u
T
([0, T ],Rdi) : uit ∈ A
i ⊂ Rdi , a.e.t ∈ [0, T ], P− a.s.
}
, ∀i ∈ ZN ,
(3)
where Uyi,u [0, T ] is a closed convex subset of L2FT ([0, T ],R
n), for i = 1, 2, . . . , N .
Thus, an N tuple of DM strategies is by definition
(u1, u2, . . . , uN) ∈ U(N),y
u
[0, T ]
△
= ×Ni=1U
yi,u [0, T ],
and hence it is a family of N functions, say,
(
µ1t (·), µ
2
t (·), . . . , µ
N
t (·)
)
, t ∈ [0, T ], which
are nonanticipative with respect to the information structures {Gy
i,u
0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]}, i =
1, 2, . . . , N .
The information structure of each DM is decentralized, and may be generated by local or
global subsystem observables.
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6(IIS): Innovations Information Structures. Let GIi,uT △= σ{I i(t) : 0 ≤ t ≤ T} denote the
information available to DM i, ∀i ∈ ZN , where {I i(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]} is the innovations of the
process {yi(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]} defined by
I i(t)
△
= yi(t)−
∫ t
0
E
{
hi(s, x1(s), . . . , xN (s), y1(s), . . . , yN(s))|Gy
i,u
0,s
}
ds, t ∈ (0, T ], ∀i ∈ ZN ,
(4)
The admissible set of decentralized innovations strategies for DM i is defined by
UI
i,u
[0, T ]
△
=
{
ui ∈ Uy
i,u
[0, T ] : uit is GI
i,u
0,t − adapted a.e.t ∈ [0, T ],P− a.s.
}
. (5)
An N tuple of DM strategies is by definition (u1, . . . , uN) ∈ U(N),Iu [0, T ] △= ×Ni=1UI
i,u
[0, T ].
Define the augmented vectors by
W
△
= (W 1, . . . ,WN) ∈ Rm, B
△
= (B1, . . . , BN) ∈ Rk, u
△
= (u1, . . . , uN) ∈ Rd, x
△
= (x1, . . . , xN ) ∈ Rn.
The distributed stochastic system dynamics are described in compact form by
dx(t) = f(t, x(t), ut)dt+ σ(t, x(t), ut) dW (t), x(0) = x0, t ∈ (0, T ], (6)
where f : [0, T ]×Rn×A(N) −→ Rn denotes the drift and σ : [0, T ]×Rn×A(N) −→ L(Rm,Rn)
the diffusion coefficients.
The distributed observation equations are described by the observation equation
y(t) =
∫ t
0
h(s, x(s), y(s))ds+
∫ t
0
D
1
2 (s)dB(s), t ∈ [0, T ], (7)
where h : [0, T ]× Rn × Rk −→ Rk is a function of the observations {y(t) : 0 ≤ t ≤ T}.
B. Pay-off Functional and Team Games
Consider the distributed system (6), (7) with decentralized partial information structures. Given
a u ∈ U(N),y
u
[0, T ], define the reward or performance criterion by
J(u) ≡ J(u1, u2, . . . , uN)
△
= E
{∫ T
0
ℓ(t, x(t), ut)dt+ ϕ(x(T )
}
, (8)
where ℓ : [0, T ]× Rn × U(N) −→ (−∞,∞] denotes the running cost function and ϕ : Rn −→
(−∞,∞], the terminal cost function. Notice that the performance of the strategies is graded by
a single pay-off functional.
The distributed stochastic team optimization problem with N DM is defined below.
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7Problem 1. (Team Optimality) Given the pay-off functional (8), constraints (6), (7) the N tuple
of strategies uo △= (u1,o, u2,o, . . . , uN,o) ∈ U(N),yu [0, T ] is called team optimal if it satisfies
J(u1,o, u2,o, . . . , uN,o) ≤ J(u1, u2, . . . , uN), ∀u
△
= (u1, u2, . . . , uN) ∈ U(N),y
u
[0, T ] (9)
Any uo ∈ U(N),yu [0, T ] satisfying (9) is called an optimal decision strategy (or control) and the
corresponding xo(·) ≡ x(·; uo(·)), yo(·) ≡ y(·; uo(·)) (satisfying (6), (7)) are called an optimal
state process and observation process, respectively.
Similarly, for uo △= (u1,o, u2,o, . . . , uN,o) ∈ U(N),Iu [0, T ].
By definition, Problem 1 is a dynamic team problem with each DM having a different information
structure (decentralized). An alternative approach to handle such problems with decentralized
information structures is to restrict the definition of optimality to the so-called person-by-person
equilibrium.
Define
J˜(v, u−i)
△
= J(u1, u2, . . . , ui−1, v, ui+1, . . . , uN), ∀ ∈∈ ZN .
Problem 2. (Person-by-Person Optimality) Given the pay-off functional (8), constraints (6), (7)
the N tuple of strategies uo △= (u1,o, u2,o, . . . , uN,o) ∈ U(N),yu [0, T ] is called person-by-person
optimal if it satisfies
J˜(ui,o, u−i,o) ≤ J˜(ui, u−i,o), ∀ui ∈ Uy
i,u
[0, T ], ∀i ∈ ZN . (10)
Similarly for uo △= (u1,o, u2,o, . . . , uN,o) ∈ U(N),Iu [0, T ].
The interpretaion of (10) is that the variation of the i-th player is done while the rest of the
players assume their optimal strategies.
In the next remark, the previous team games formulation is discussed in the context of
distributed estimation.
Remark 1. In distributed estimation each subsystem is described by unforced coupled stochastic
June 24, 2018 DRAFT
8differential equations
dxi(t) =f i(t, xi(t))dt+ σi(t, xi(t))dW i(t) +
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
f ij(t, xj(t))dt
+
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
σij(t, xj(t))dW j(t), xi(0) = xi0, t ∈ (0, T ], ∀i ∈ ZN , (11)
while the observations for each subsystem are described by (1). The distributed estimation objec-
tive is to determine an N tuple of decision strategies uo △= (u1,o, u2,o, . . . , uN,o) ∈ U(N),yu [0, T ]
which is team optimal or person-by-person optimal (according to Problems 1, 2) subject to
constraints (11), (1). This distributed estimation problem formulated via team theory, is a
generalization of the static team theory discussed in [20], [22], [23], [36]. However, we point
out that for distributed filtering there is no reason to consider innovations information structures.
III. STRONG SOLUTIONS AND VARIATIONAL EQUATION
In this section we introduce assumptions which will allow us to show existence of strong
FT−adapted continuous solutions to (6) and (7). We also introduce the variational equation
which is utilized to derive the stochastic minimum principle using the methodology in [1], [2].
Let B∞FT ([0, T ], L
2(Ω,Rn)) denote the space of FT -adapted Rn valued second order random
processes endowed with the norm topology ‖ · ‖ defined by
‖ x ‖2
△
= sup
t∈[0,T ]
E|x(t)|2Rn .
The existence of strong solution is based on the following assumptions.
Assumptions 1. (Main assumptions) The coefficients of the state and observation equations (6),
(7) are Borel measurable maps:
f : [0, T ]× Rn × A(N) −→ Rn, σ : [0, T ]× Rn × A(N) −→ L(Rm,Rn),
hi : [0, T ]× Rn × Rk −→ Rki, ∀i ∈ ZN .
These satisfy the following basic conditions.
There exists a K > 0 such that
(A1) |f(t, x, u)− f(t, z, u)|Rn ≤ K|x− z|Rn uniformly in u ∈ A(N);
(A2) |f(t, x, u)− f(t, x, v)|Rn ≤ K|u− v|Rd uniformly in x ∈ Rn;
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9(A3) |f(t, x, u)|Rn ≤ K(1 + |x|Rn + |u|Rd);
(A4) |σ(t, x, u)− σ(t, z, u)|L(Rm,Rn) ≤ K|x− z|Rn uniformly in u ∈ A(N);
(A5) |σ(t, x, u)− σ(t, x, v)|L(Rm,Rn) ≤ K|u− v|Rd uniformly in x ∈ Rn;
(A6) |σ(t, x, u)|L(Rm,Rn) ≤ K(1 + |x|Rn + |u|Rd);
(A7) |h(t, x, y)|Rk ≤ K(1 + |x|Rn + |y|Rk);
(A8) |h(t, x, y)− h(t, z, y˜)|Rk ≤ K
(
|x− z|Rn + |y − y˜|Rk
)
;
(A9) For any a, b ∈ C([0, T ],Rki) the nonanticipative mapping ui ≡ µi : [0, T ]×C([0, T ],Rki) −→
Ai satisfies the Lipschitz condition
|µi(t, a)− µi(t, b)|Rdi ≤ K|a− b|C([0,T ],Rki), i = 1, . . . , N.
A10) Di, 12 (t) > 0, ∀t ∈ [0, T ] and Di, 12 (·) is uniformly bounded, ∀i ∈ ZN .
The following lemma proves the existence of solutions and their continuous dependence on the
decision variables.
Lemma 1. Suppose Assumptions 1 hold. Then for any F0,0-measurable initial state x0 having
finite second moment, and any u ∈ U(N),yu [0, T ], the following hold.
(1) System (6), (7) has a unique solution (x, y) ∈ B∞FT ([0, T ], L2(Ω,Rn+k)) having a
continuous modification, that is, (x, y) ∈ C([0, T ],Rn+k), P−a.s, ∀i ∈ ZN .
(2) The solution of system (6), (7) is continuously dependent on the control, in the sense
that, as ui,α −→ ui,o in Uyi,u [0, T ], ∀i ∈ ZN , (xα, yα) −→ (xo, yo) in B∞FT ([0, T ], L
2(Ω,Rn+k)),
∀i ∈ ZN .
Similarly for u ∈ U(N),Iu [0, T ].
Proof: (1) Consider the augmented system X △= (x, y) and the associated stochastic differ-
ential equation of X . The proof for the first part of the lemma is classical and hence omitted.
(2) Next, we consider the second part asserting the continuity of u to solution map u −→ (x, y).
Let {{ui,α : i = 1, 2, . . . , N}, uo} be any pair of DM strategies from U(N),yu [0, T ]×U(N),yu [0, T ]
and {xα, yα, xo, yo} denote the corresponding pair of solutions of the system (6), (7). Let ui,α −→
ui,o, i = 1, 2, . . . , N . We must show that (xα, yα) −→ (xo, yo) in B∞FT ([0, T ], L
2(Ω, Rn+k)). By
June 24, 2018 DRAFT
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the definition of solution to (6), it can be verified that
xα(t)− xo(t) =
∫ t
0
{
f(s, xα(s), uαs )− f(s, x
o(s), uαs )
}
ds
+
∫ t
0
{
σ(s, xα(s), uαs )− σ(s, x
o(s), uαs )
}
dW (s) + eα1 (t) + e
α
2 (t), t ∈ [0, T ],
(12)
where
eα1 (t) =
∫ t
0
{
f(s, xo(s), uαs )− f(s, x
o(s), uos)]ds (13)
eα2 (t) =
∫ t
0
{
σ(s, xo(s), uαs )− σ(s, x
o(s), uos)
}
dW (s). (14)
Using the standard martingale inequality into (12), it follows from it and (A1), (A4) that there
exist constants C1, C2 > 0 such that
E|xα(t)− xo(t)|2Rn ≤ C1
∫ t
0
K2E|xα(s)− xo(s)|2Rn + C2
(
E|eα1 (t)|
2
Rn + E|e
α
2 (t)|
2
Rn
)
. (15)
Clearly, by the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality, and martingale inequality, it follows from (A2),
(A5) that
E|eα1 (t)|
2
Rn ≤T E
∫ t
0
|f(s, xo(s), uαs )− f(s, x
o(s), uos)|
2
Rnds ≤ TE
∫ t
0
K2|uαs − u
o
s)|
2
Rd
ds, (16)
E|eα2 (t)|
2
Rn ≤4 E
∫ t
0
|σ(s, xo(s), uαs )− σ(s, x
o(s), uos)|
2
L(Rm,Rn)ds ≤ 4 E
∫ t
0
K2|uαs − u
o
s|
2
Rdds.
(17)
Similarly, by (A8)
E|yα(t)− yo(t)|2
Rk
≤ T
∫ t
0
K2E
(
|xα(s)− xo(s)|2Rn + |y
α(s)− yo(s)|2
Rk
)
ds. (18)
The integrands in the right side of inequalities (16), (17) converge to zero for almost all
s ∈ [0, T ],P−a.s. Moreover, these integrands are dominated by integrable functions. Hence,
by Lebesgue dominated convergence theorem the terms {eα1 , eα2} converge to zero uniformly on
[0, T ]. Define ρα(t) △= E
(
|xα(s)− xo(s)|2Rn + |y
α(s)− yo(s)|2
Rk
)
. Then by Gronwall inequality
applied to ρα, it can be shown that ρα −→ 0 as ui,α −→ ui,o in Uyi,u [0, T ], ∀i ∈ ZN . The above
analysis holds for innovations information structures. This completes the derivation.
Throughout the paper we assume existence of a minimizer uo ∈ U(N),yu [0, T ] for Problem 1.
For randomize (relaxed) strategies existence can be shown as in [2].
June 24, 2018 DRAFT
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Next, we prepare to introduce the variational equation of the augmented system (x, y).
Define the augmented vectors
X
△
= (x, y) ∈ Rn × Rk, B
△
= (B1, B2, . . . , BN) ∈ Rk, y
△
= (y1, y2, . . . , yN) ∈ Rk,
and the augmented drift and diffusion coefficients, and terms in the pay-off associated with them
by
F (t, X, u)
△
=

 f(t, x, u)
h(t, x, y)

 , G(t, X, u) △=

 σ(t, x, u) 0
0 D
1
2 (t)

 ,
h(t, x, y)
△
=


h1(t, x, y)
. . .
hN(t, x, y)

 , D 12 (t) △= diag{D1, 12 (t), . . . , DN, 12 (t)}
L(t, X, u)
△
= ℓ(t, x, u), Φ(X)
△
= ϕ(x).
Then the augmented system is expressed in compact form by
dX(t) = F (t, X(t), ut)dt+G(t, X(t), ut)

 dW (t)
dB(t)

 , X(0) = X0, t ∈ (0, T ]. (19)
For strategies U(N),yu [0, T ], since the state of the augmented system is X = (x, y), when
considering variations of the state trajectory X , due to variation of u, there will be derivatives
of u(·) with respect to y. To avoid this technicality we introduce the following assumptions.
Assumptions 2. The diffusion coefficients σ is restricted to the Borel measurable map σ :
[0, T ]× Rn × A(N) −→ L(Rn,Rn) (e.g., it is independent of u) and
(A11) σ(·, ·) and σ−1(·, ·) are bounded.
Under the additional Assumptions 2 we can show the following Lemma.
Lemma 2. Consider Problem 1 under Assumptions 1, 2 hold. Define the σ−algebras
F
x(0),W,B
0,t
△
= σ
{
(x(0),W (s), B(s)) : 0 ≤ s ≤ t
}
, Fx
u,yu
0,t
△
= σ
{
(x(s), y(s)) : 0 ≤ s ≤ t
}
, ∀t ∈ [0, T ].
If u ∈ U(N),yureg [0, T ] then Fx(0),W,B0,t = Fx
u,yu
0,t , ∀t ∈ [0, T ].
Proof: This follows directly from Assumptions 2 and the invertibility of Di(·), ∀i ∈ ZN .
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Recall that {x(t), y(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]} are the strong FT−adapted solutions of the state and observa-
tion equations. Under the conditions of Lemma 2 for any ui ∈ Uyi,u [0, T ] which is Gy
i,u
T −adapted
there exists a function φi(·) measurable with respect to a sub-σ−algebra of F0,t ⊂ Fx(0),W,B0,t
such that uit(ω) = φi(t, x(0), B(·
∧
t, ω),W (·
∧
t, ω)),P− a.s. ω ∈ Ω, ∀t ∈ [0, T ], i = 1, . . . N .
Define all such adapted nonanticipative functions by
U
i
na[0, T ]
△
=
{
ui ∈ L2F
T
([0, T ],Rdi) : uit ∈ A
i ⊂ Rdi , a.e.t ∈ [0, T ], P− a.s.
}
, ∀i ∈ ZN . (20)
Next, we introduce the following additional assumptions.
Assumptions 3. Uyi,u [0, T ] is dense in Uina[0, T ], ∀i ∈ ZN .
Under Assumptions 3 we can show the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Consider Problem 1 under Assumptions 1, 3. Further, assume ℓ is Borel measurable,
continuously differentiable with respect to (x, u), and ϕ is continously differentiable with respect
to x, and there exist K1, K2 > 0 such that
|ℓx(t, x, u)|Rn + |ℓu(t, x, u)|Rd| ≤ K1
(
1 + |x|Rn + |u|Rd
)
, |ϕx(T, x)|R ≤ K2
(
1 + |x|Rn
)
.
Then
inf
u∈×Ni=1U
i
na[0,T ]
J(u) = inf
u∈×Ni=1U
yi,u [0,T ]
J(u). (21)
Proof: Since Assumptions 3 holds, it is sufficient to show that as ui,α −→ ui in Uina[0, T ],
∀i ∈ ZN , then J(uα) −→ J(u). From the derivation of Lemma 1, we can show that E sups∈[0,t] |xα(s)−
x(s)|Rn converges to zero as α −→ ∞, hence it is sufficient to show that |J(uα) − J(u)| also
converges to zero, as α −→∞. By the assumptions on {ℓ, ϕ}, and by the mean value theorem
we have the following inequality.
|J(uα)− J(u)| ≤K1 E
{∫
[0,T ]
(
|xα(t)|Rn + |u
α
t |Rd + |x(t)|Rn + |ut|Rd + 1
)
.
(
|xα(t)− x(t)|Rn + |u
α
t − ut|Rd
)
dt
}
+K2E
{(
|xα(T )|Rn + |x(T )|Rn + 1
)
|xα(T )− x(t)|Rn
}
. (22)
Since E sups∈[0,t] |xα(s) − x(s)|Rn −→ 0 as α −→ ∞, then |J(uα) − J(u)| also converges to
zero, as α −→ ∞.
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The point to be made regarding Theorem 1 is that if u ∈ U(N),yu [0, T ] achieves the infi-
mum of J(u) then it is also optimal with respect to some measurable functionals of subsets
{(x(0), (W (s), B(s)) : 0 ≤ s ≤ T}. Consequently, the necessary conditions for u ∈ U(N),yu [0, T ]
to be optimal are those for which u ∈ ×Ni=1U
i
na[0, T ] is optimal.
Remark 2. Strategies adapted to the innovations process ui ∈ GIi,uT , ∀i ∈ ZN are often utilized
to derive the separation theorem of partially observed stochastic control problems. It is well
known that {I i,u(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]} is an Gy
i,u
T −adapted Wiener process. Moreover, if the innovations
process and observation process generate the same σ−algebra, Gy
i,u
0,s = G
Ii,u
0,s , and the innovations
process is independent of u, then I i,u(t) = I i,0(t), ∀t ∈ [0, T ]. Define the σ−algebra GIi,00,t △=
σ{I i,0(s) : 0 ≤ s ≤ t}, t ∈ [0, T ]. Under these conditions the necessary conditions for u ∈
U(N),y
u
[0, T ] to be optimal are those for which u ∈ U(N),I0 [0, T ], defined by
U(N),I
0
[0, T ]
△
=
{
U(N),y
u
: uit is GI
i,0
0,t − adapted, ∀i ∈ ZN
}
. (23)
Note that Assumptions 3 are not required for distributed filtering applications because the
decentralized information structures GyiT are independent of u, and hence it is not very difficult
to show Gy
i
T = G
Ii,0
T , ∀i ∈ ZN .
After deriving the necessary conditions we also show that under certain convexity conditions that
these are also sufficient. Consequently, for the sufficient part we do not require Assumptions 3.
For the derivation of stochastic minimum principle of optimality we shall require stronger
regularity conditions on the maps {f, σ, h}, as well as, for the running and terminal pay-offs
functions {ℓ, ϕ}. These are given below.
Assumptions 4. E|x(0)|Rn <∞ and the maps of {f, σ, ℓ, ϕ} satisfy the following conditions.
(B1) The map f : [0, T ] × Rn × A(N) −→ Rn is continuous in (t, x, u) and continously
differentiable with respect to (x, u);
(B2) The map σ : [0, T ]×Rn×A(N) −→ L(Rm;Rn) is continuous in (t, x, u) and continously
differentiable with respect to (x, u);
(B3) The map h : [0, T ] × Rn × Rk −→ Rk is continuous in (t, x, y) and continously
differentiable with respect to (x, y);
(B4) The first derivatives {fx, fu, σx, σu} are bounded uniformly on [0, T ]× Rn × A(N);
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(B5) The first derivative {hx, hy} are bounded uniformly on [0, T ]× Rn × Rk;
(B6) The maps ℓ : [0, T ] × Rn × A(N) −→ (−∞,∞] is Borel measurable, continuously
differentiable with respect to (x, u), the map ϕ : [0, T ]×Rn −→ (−∞,∞] is continously
differentiable with respect to x, and there exist K1, K2 > 0 such that
|ℓx(t, x, u)|Rn + |ℓu(t, x, u)|Rd| ≤ K1
(
1 + |x|Rn + |u|Rd
)
, |ϕx(T, x)|Rn ≤ K2
(
1 + |x|Rn
)
(B7) Conditions (A9), (A10) of Assumptions 1 hold.
Consider the Gateaux derivative of G with respect to the variable at the point (t, z, v) ∈ [0, T ]×
Rn+k × A(N) in the direction η ∈ Rn+k defined by
GX(t, z, v; η)
△
= lim
ε→0
1
ε
{
G(t, z + εη, ν)−G(t, z, v)
}
, t ∈ [0, T ].
Note that the map η −→ GX(t, z, ν; η) is linear, and it follows from Assumptions 4, (B3), (B5)
that there exists a finite positive number β > 0 such that
|GX(t, z, ν; η)|L(Rm+k,Rn+k) ≤ β|η|Rn+k , t ∈ [0, T ].
In order to present the necessary conditions of optimality we need the so called variational
equation. Suppose uo △= (u1,o, u2,o, . . . , uN,o) ∈ U(N),Iu [0, T ] denotes the optimal decision and
u
△
= (u1, u2, . . . , un) ∈ U(N),I
u
[0, T ] any other decision. Since UIi,u [0, T ] is convex ∀i ∈ ZN , it
is clear that for any ε ∈ [0, 1],
u
i,ε
t
△
= ui,ot + ε(u
i
t − u
i,o
t ) ∈ U
Ii,u [0, T ], ∀i ∈ ZN .
Let Xε(·) ≡ Xε(·; uε(·)) and Xo(·) ≡ Xo(·; uo(·)) ∈ B∞FT ([0, T ], L
2(Ω,Rn+k)) denote the
solutions of the system equation (19) corresponding to uε(·) and uo(·), respectively. Consider
the limit
Z(t)
△
= lim
ε↓0
1
ε
{
Xε(t)−Xo(t)
}
, t ∈ [0, T ].
We have the following result characterizing the the variational process {Z(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]}.
Lemma 3. Suppose Assumptions 4 hold. For strategies U(N),Iu [0, T ] the process {Z(t) : t ∈
[0, T ]} is an element of the Banach space B∞FT ([0, T ], L2(Ω,Rn+k)) and it is the unique solution
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of the variational stochastic differential equation
dZ(t) = FX(t, X
o(t), uot )Z(t)dt+GX(t, X
o(t), uot ;Z(t))

 dW (t)
dB(t)


+
N∑
i=1
Fui(t, X
o(t), u,ot )(u
i
t − u
i,o
t )dt+
N∑
i=1
Gui(t, X
o(t), uot ; u
i
t − u
i,o
t )

 dW (t)
dB(t)

 , Z(0) = 0.
(24)
having a continuous modification.
Under the addition Assumptions 3 the above statements hold for strategies U(N),yu [0, T ].
Moreover, (24) is the variational equation for distributed filtering applications (without imposing
Assumptions 3).
Proof: This follows from [1] by considering the augmented system.
Using the variation equation of Lemma 3, we note that the results given in [1] for nonrandomized
strategies are directly applicable to the augmented system (19). In fact one can also consider
randomized strategies as in [1].
IV. OPTIMALITY CONDITIONS FOR NOISY INFORMATION STRUCTURES
In this section we derive necessary and sufficient optimality conditions for the team game of
Problem 1. In view of the results obtained in the previous section, specifically, Lemma 3, the
stochastic minimum principle of optimality for Problem 1, described in terms of the augmented
system (19), follows directly from the results in [1].
Before we introduce the optimality conditions we define the Hamiltonian system of equations.
To this end, define the Hamiltonian
H : [0, T ]× Rn × Rn × L(Rm,Rn)× A(N) −→ R
by
H(t, x, ψ, q11, u)
△
= 〈f(t, x, u), ψ〉+ tr(q∗11σ(t, x)) + ℓ(t, x, u), t ∈ [0, T ]. (25)
For any u ∈ U(N),yu [0, T ],U(N),Iu [0, T ], the adjoint process is
(ψ, q11, q12) ∈ L
2
FT
([0, T ],Rn)× L2FT ([0, T ],L(R
m,Rn))× L2FT ([0, T ],L(R
k,Rn))
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and satisfies the following backward stochastic differential equation
dψ(t) =− f ∗x(t, x(t), ut)ψ(t)dt− Vq11(t)dt− ℓx(t, x(t), ut)dt
+ q11(t)dW (t) + q12(t)dB(t), t ∈ [0, T ),
=−Hx(t, x(t), ψ(t), q11(t), ut)dt+ q11(t)dW (t) + q12(t)dB(t), t ∈ [0, T ), (26)
ψ(T ) =ϕx(x(T )), (27)
where Vq11 ∈ L2FT ([0, T ],R
n) is given by 〈Vq11(t), ζ〉 = tr(q∗11(t)σx(t, x(t); ζ)), t ∈ [0, T ] (e.g.,
Vq11(t) =
∑n
k=1
(
σ
(k)
x (t, x(t))
)∗
q
(k)
11 (t), t ∈ [0, T ], σ
(k) is the kth column of σ, σ(k)x is the
derivative of σ(k) with respect to the state, q(k)11 is the kth column of q11, for k = 1, 2, . . . , m).
The state process satisfies the stochastic differential equation
dx(t) = f(t, x(t), ut)dt+ σ(t, x(t))dW (t), t ∈ (0, T ],
= Hψ(t, x(t), ψ(t), q11(t), ut)dt+ σ(t, x(t))dW (t), t ∈ (0, T ], (28)
x(0) = x0 (29)
The above Hamiltonian system of equations is expressed in terms of the original distributed
system of equations (6), (7), and it is obtained by first deriving the Hamiltonian system of
equations for the augmented system (19) (we shall clarify this step in the next section).
A. Necessary Conditions of Optimality
We now prepare to derive the necessary conditions for team optimality. Specifically, given
that uo ∈ U(N),yu [0, T ] or uo ∈ U(N),Iu [0, T ] is team optimal the question we address is whether
it satisfies the Hamiltonian system of equations (25)-(29).
By utilizing [1] we have following necessary conditions.
Theorem 2. (Necessary conditions for team optimality) Consider Problem 1 under Assump-
tions 4, and Ai a closed, bounded and convex subset of Rki, i = 1, . . . N .
For an element uo ∈ U(N),Iu [0, T ] with the corresponding solution xo ∈ B∞FT ([0, T ], L
2(Ω,Rn))
to be team optimal, it is necessary that the following hold.
(1) There exists a square integrable semi martingale mo with the intensity process (ψo, qo11, q12) ∈
L2FT ([0, T ],R
n)× L2FT ([0, T ],L(R
m,Rn))× L2FT ([0, T ],L(R
k,Rn)).
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(2) The variational inequality is satisfied:
N∑
i=1
E
∫ T
0
〈Hui(t, x
o(t), ψo(t), qo11(t), u
o
t ), u
i
t − u
i,o
t 〉dt ≥ 0, ∀u ∈ U
(N)I
u
[0, T ]. (30)
(3) The process (ψo, qo11, qo12) ∈ L2FT ([0, T ],Rn)×L2FT ([0, T ],L(Rm,Rn))×L2FT ([0, T ],L(Rk,Rn))
is a unique solution of the backward stochastic differential equation (26), (27) such
that uo ∈ U(N),Iu [0, T ] satisfies the point wise almost sure inequalities with respect to
the σ-algebras GIi,u0,t ⊂ F0,t, t ∈ [0, T ], i = 1, 2, . . . , N :
〈E
{
Hui(t, x
o(t), ψo(t), qo11(t), u
o
t )|G
Ii,u
o
0,t
}
, uit − u
i,o
t 〉 ≥ 0,
∀ui ∈ Ai, a.e.t ∈ [0, T ],P|
GI
i,uo
0,t
− a.s., i = 1, 2, . . .N. (31)
Under the additional Assumptions 3 the results also hold for strategies U(N),yu [0, T ] with con-
ditional expectation taken with respect to Gy
i,uo
0,t .
For distributed filtering strategies are u ∈ U(N),y[0, T ] with conditional expectation taken with
respect to Gy
i,uo
0,t .
Proof: The derivation consists of two steps. The first step utilizes [1] to derive the optimality
conditions for the augmented system (19). Hence, by direct application of [1] we have the
following.
Define the Hamiltonian of the augmented system (19)
H : [0, T ]× Rn+k × Rn+k × L(Rn+k,Rn+k)× A(N) −→ R
by
H(t, X,Ψ,M, u)
△
= 〈F (t, X, u), ζ〉+ tr(M∗G(t, X)) + L(t, X, u), t ∈ [0, T ]. (32)
Then the result of [1] for nonrandomized strategies apply to the system (19), hence for any
u ∈ ×Ni=1U
yi,u [0, T ] or u ∈ ×Ni=1U
Ii,u [0, T ] the adjoint process of the augmented system exists
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and satisfies the following backward stochastic differential equation.
dΨ(t) = −F ∗X(t, X(t), ut)Ψ(t)dt− VQ(t)dt− LX(t, X(t), ut)dt+Q(t)

 dW (t)
dB(t)

 , t ∈ [0, T ),
= −HX(t, X(t),Ψ(t), Q(t), ut)dt+Q(t)

 dW (t)
dB(t)

 , Ψ(T ) = ΦX(X(T )), t ∈ [0, T ),
(33)
where VQ is given by 〈VQ(t), ζ〉 = tr(Q∗(t)GX(t, X(t); ζ)), t ∈ [0, T ].
The second step translates the necessary conditions of the augmented system to the original
system (6), (7). To this end, we introduce the following decompositions which will lead to a
simplified Hamiltonian system of equations.
Ψ
△
=

 ψ
ζ

 , Q △=

 q11 q12
q21 q22

 . (34)
By utilizing this decomposition it can be shown that ψ satisfies (26), (27). The second component
of Ψ in (34) satisfies the following equation
dζ(t) = q21(t)dW (t) + q22(t)dB(t), ζ(T ) = 0, t ∈ [0, T ). (35)
Since this equation has terminal condition ζ(T ) = 0, and its right hand side martingale terms are
orthogonal, then necessarily, q21(t) = 0, q22(t) = 0, ∀t ∈ [0, T ], a.s., which imply ζ(t) = 0, ∀t ∈
[0, T ], a.s. Finally, statements (1)-(3) are obtained from equivalent statements of the augmented
system [1].
It is interesting to note that the necessary conditions for a uo ∈ U(N),yu [0, T ] or uo ∈
U(N),I
u
[0, T ] to be a person-by-person optimal can be derived following the methodology of
Theorem 2, and that these necessary conditions are the same as the necessary conditions for the
team optimal strategy. These results are stated as a Corollary.
Corollary 1. (Necessary conditions for person-by-person optimality) Consider Problem 2 under
the assumptions of Theorem 2. For an element uo ∈ U(N),Iu [0, T ] with the corresponding solution
xo ∈ B∞FT ([0, T ], L
2(Ω,Rn)) to be a person-by-person optimal strategy, it is necessary that the
statements of Theorem 2, (1), (3) hold and statement (2) is replaced by
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(2’) The variational inequalities are satisfied:
E
∫ T
0
〈Hui(t, x
o(t), ψo(t), qo11(t), u
o
t ), u
i
t − u
i,o
t 〉dt ≥ 0, ∀u
i ∈ Ui,I
i,u
[0, T ], ∀i ∈ ZN .
(36)
Under the additional Assumptions 3 the results also hold for strategies U(N),yu [0, T ] with con-
ditional expectation taken with respect to Gy
i,uo
0,t .
For distributed filtering strategies are u ∈ U(N),y[0, T ] with conditional expectation taken with
respect to Gy
i,uo
0,t .
Proof: The derivation is based on the procedure of Theorem 2, which is completely described
in [1]
The following remark helps identifying the martingale term in the adjoint process.
Remark 3. According to [1], the Riesz representation theorem for Hilbert space martinagles,
determine the maritingale term of the adjoint process Mt =
∫ t
0
ΨoX(s)G(s,X
o(s))

 dW (s)
dB(s)

,
dual to the first martingale term in the variational equation (24), hence Q in the adjoint equation,
is identified as Q(t) ≡ ΨX(t)G(t, X(t)). By translating this to the original system then q11 =
ψxσ, q12 = ψyD
1
2 , provided the derivatives ψx, ψy exist.
B. Sufficient Conditions of Optimality
In this section, we show that the necessary condition of optimality (31) is also a sufficient
condition for optimality, under a convexity conditions on the Hamiltonians and the terminal
condition.
Theorem 3. (Sufficient conditions for team optimality) Consider Problem 1 with strategies from
U(N),I
u
[0, T ] (respectively U(N),yu [0, T ]), under Assumptions 4, and Ai a closed, bounded and
convex subset of Rki, i = 1, . . . N . Let (xo(·), uo(·)) denote an admissible state and decision pair
and let ψo(·) the corresponding adjoint processes.
Suppose the following conditions hold.
(C4) H(t, ·, ψ, q11, ·), t ∈ [0, T ] is convex in (x, u) ∈ Rn × A(N);
(C5) ϕ(·) is convex in x ∈ Rn.
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Then (xo(·), uo(·)) is a team optimal pair if it satisfies (31) (respectively (31) with conditional
expectation taken in terms of Gyi,u
o
0,t , i = 1, . . . N).
Proof: Let uo ∈ U(N),yu [0, T ] denote a candidate for the optimal team decision and u ∈
U(N),y
u
[0, T ] any other decision. Then
J(uo)− J(u) = E
{∫ T
0
(
ℓ(t, xo(t), uot )− ℓ(t, x(t), ut)
)
dt+
(
ϕ(xo(T ))− ϕ(x(T ))
)}
. (37)
By the convexity of ϕ(·) then
ϕ(x(T ))− ϕ(xo(T )) ≥ 〈ϕx(x
o(T )), x(T )− xo(T )〉. (38)
Substituting (38) into (37) yields
J(uo)− J(u) ≤ E
{
〈ϕx(x
o(T )), xo(T )− x(T )〉
}
+E
{∫ T
0
(
ℓ(t, xo(t), uot )− ℓ(t, x(t), ut)
)
dt
}
. (39)
Applying the Ito differential rule to 〈ψo, x−xo〉 on the interval [0, T ] and then taking expecation
we obtain the following equation.
E
{
〈ψo(T ), x(T )− xo(T )〉
}
= E
{
〈ψo(0), x(0)− xo(0)〉
}
+ E
{∫ T
0
〈−f ∗x(t, x
o(t), uot )ψ
o(t)dt− Vqo
11
(t)− ℓx(t, x
o(t), uot ), x(t)− x
o(t)〉dt
}
+ E
{∫ T
0
〈ψo(t), f(t, x(t), ut)− f(t, x
o(t), uot )〉dt
}
+ E
{∫ T
0
tr(q∗,o11 (t)σ(t, x(t))− q
∗,o
11 (t)σ(t, x
o(t))dt
}
= −E
{∫ T
0
〈Hx(t, x
o(t), ψo(t), qo11(t), u
o
t ), x(t)− x
o(t)〉dt
+ E
{∫ T
0
〈ψo(t), f(t, x(t), ut)− f(t, x
o(t), uot )〉dt
}
+ E
{∫ T
0
tr(q∗,o11 (t)σ(t, x(t))− q
∗,o
11 (t)σ(t, x
o(t)))dt
}
(40)
Note that ψo(T ) = ϕx(xo(T )). Substituting (40) into (39) we obtain
J(uo)− J(u) ≤E
{∫ T
0
[
H(t, xo(t), ψo(t), qo11(t), u
o
t )−H(t, x(t), ψ
o(t), qo11(t), ut)
]
dt
}
−E
{∫ T
0
〈Hx(t, x
o(t), ψo(t), qo11(t), u
o
t ), x
o(t)− x(t)〉dt
}
. (41)
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Since by hypothesis H is convex in (x, u) ∈ Rn × A(N), then
H(t, x(t),ψo(t), qo11(t), ut)−H(t, x
o(t), ψo(t), qo11(t), u
o
t )
≥
N∑
i=1
〈Hui(t, x
o(t), ψo(t), qo11(t), u
o
t ), u
i − ui,ot 〉
+〈Hx(t, x
o(t), ψo(t), Qo(t), uot ), x(t)− x
o(t)〉, t ∈ [0, T ] (42)
Substituting (42) into (41) yields
J(uo)− J(u) ≤ −E
{ N∑
i=1
∫ T
0
〈Hui(t, x
o(t), ψo(t), qo11(t), u
o
t ), u
i
t − u
i,o
t )dt
}
. (43)
By (31) and by definition of conditional expectation we have
E
{
IAit(ω)〈Hui(t, x
o(t), ψo(t), qo11(t), u
o
t ), u
i
t − u
i,o
t 〉
}
= E
{
IAit(ω)E
{
〈Hui(t, x
o(t), ψo(t), qo11(t), u
o
t ), u
i
t − u
i,o
t 〉|G
yi,u
0,t
}}
≥ 0, ∀Ait ∈ G
yi,u
0,t , ∀i ∈ ZN .
(44)
Hence, 〈Hui(t, xo(t), ψo(t), qo11(t), uot ), uit − u
i,o
t 〉 ≥ 0, ∀u
i
t ∈ A
i, a.e.t ∈ [0, T ],P − a.s., i =
1, 2, . . . , N . Substituting the this inequality into (43) gives
J(uo) ≤ J(u), ∀u ∈ U(N),y
u
[0, T ].
Hence, sufficiency of (31) with conditional expectation taken in terms of Gyi,u
o
0,t , i = 1, . . .N is
shown. For U(N),Iu [0, T ] the derivation is identical.
Since the necessary conditions for team optimal and person-by-person optimal are equivalent
(this follows from Theorem 2, Corollary 1), then one can go one step further to show that under
the conditions of Theorem 3, that any person-by-person optimal strategy is also a team optimal
strategy.
We conclude our discussion on team and person-by-person game optimality conditions for
distributed stochastic differential systems with decentralized noisy information structures, by
stating once again that the results derived are also applicable to distributed estimation problems
(see Remark 1) with strategies taken from U(N),yu [0, T ].
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V. APPLICATIONS IN COMMUNICATION, FILTERING AND CONTROL
In this section we investigate various applications of the optimality conditions to communi-
cation, filtering and control applications. For most applications we give explicit optimal team
strategies, when the dynamics and the reward have the structures defined below. Throughout, we
assume validity of the convexity conditions of Theorem 3, (C4), (C5), why imply sufficiency
of (31) with conditional expectation taken in terms of Gyi,u
o
0,t , i = 1, . . . N , and strategies taken
from U(N),yu [0, T ].
Definition 1. (Team games with special structures) We define the following classes of team
games.
(NF): Nonlinear Form. The team game is said to have ”nonlinear form” if
f(t, x, u)
△
=b(t, x) + g(t, x)u, g(t, x)u
△
=
N∑
j=1
g(j)(t, x)uj, (45)
σ(t, x)
△
=
[
σ(1)(t, x) σ(2)(t, x) . . . σ(N)(t, x)
]
(46)
ℓ(t, x, u)
△
=
1
2
〈u,R(t, x)u〉+
1
2
λ(t, x) + 〈u, η(t, x)〉, (47)
where
〈u,R(t, x)u〉
△
=
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
ui,∗Rij(t, x)u
j , 〈u, η(t, x)〉
△
=
N∑
i=1
ui,∗ηi(t, x),
and σ(i)(·, ·) is the ith column of an n×m matrix σ(·, ·), for i = 1, 2, . . . , m, R(·, ·) is symmetric
uniformly positive definite, and λ(·, ·) is uniformly positive semidefinite.
(LQF): Linear-Quadratic Form. A team game is said to have ”linear-quadratic form” if
f(t, x, u) =A(t)x+B(t)u, σ(t, x, u) = G(t), (48)
ℓ(t, x) =
1
2
〈u,R(t)u〉+
1
2
〈x,H(t)x〉+ 〈x, F (t)〉+ 〈u,E(t)x〉+ 〈u,m(t)〉, (49)
and R(·) is symmetric uniformly positive definite and H(·) is symmetric uniformly positive
semidefinite.
Below we compute the optimal strategies for the two cases of Definition 1. First, we introduce
the following definitions.
ûi,j,o(t)
△
= E
(
u
i,o
t |G
yj,u
o
0,t
)
, ûi,o(t)
△
= V ector{û1,i,o(t), . . . , ûN,i,o(t)}, i, j = 1 . . . , N,
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ûo(t)
△
= V ector{û1,o(t), . . . , ûN,o(t)}, x̂o(t)
△
= V ector{E
(
xo(t)|Gy
1,uo
0,t
)
, . . . ,E
(
xo(t)|Gy
N,uo
0,t
)
},
ψ̂o(t)
△
= V ector{E
(
ψo(t)|Gy
1,uo
0,t
)
, . . . ,E
(
ψo(t)|Gy
N,uo
0,t
)
},
R[i](t)
△
=
[
Ri1(t), . . . , RiN (t)
]
, E[i](t)
△
=
[
Ei1(t), . . . , EiN (t)
]
, i = 1, . . . , N.
Case NF.
Utilizing the definition of Hamiltonian of Theorem 2, its derivative is given by
Hu(t, x, ψ, q11, u) = g
∗(t, x)ψ +R(t, x)u+ η(t, x), (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn. (50)
The explicit expression for ui,ot is given by
u
i,o
t =−
{
E
(
Rii(t, x
o(t))|Gy
i,uo
0,t
)}−1{
E
(
ηi(t, xo(t))|Gy
i,uo
0,t
)
+
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
E
(
Rij(t, x
o(t))uj,ot |G
yi,u
o
0,t
)
− E
(
g(i),∗(t, xo(t))ψo(t)|Gy
i,uo
0,t
)}
, P|
G
yi,u
o
0,t
− a.s., i = 1, 2, . . . , N. (51)
Special Case. Suppose R(t, x) = R(t), e.g., independent of x. Since both sides of (51) are
Gy
i,uo
0,t −measurable taking conditional expectations of both side with respect to G
yi,u
o
0,t − gives the
expression
ûi,i,o(t) =−
{
Rii(t)
}−1{
E
(
ηi(t, xo(t))|Gy
i,uo
0,t
)
+
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
Rij(t)ûj,i,o(t)
− E
(
g(i),∗(t, xo(t))ψo(t)|Gy
i,uo
0,t
)}
, P|
G
yi,u
o
0,t
− a.s., i = 1, 2, . . . , N. (52)
The last equation can be written in the form of a fixed point matrix equation with random
coefficients. We discuss this below.
Case LQF.
For a team game is of normal form then from the previous optimal strategies one obtains
u
i,o
t =− R
−1
ii (t)
{
mi(t) +
N∑
j=1
Eij(t)E
(
xj,o(t)|Gy
i,uo
0,t
)
+
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
Rij(t)E
(
u
j,o
t |G
yi,u
o
0,t
)
− B(i),∗(t)E
(
ψo(t)|Gy
i,uo
0,t
)}
, P|
G
yi,u
o
0,t
− a.s., i = 1, 2, . . . , N. (53)
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Similarly as above, (53) can be put in the form of fixed point matrix equation as follows.
diag{R[1](t), . . . , R[N ](t)}ûo(t)+diag{E[1](t), . . . , E[N ](t)}x̂o(t)
+ diag{B(1),∗(t), . . . , B(N),∗(t)}ψ̂o(t) +m(t) = 0. (54)
Therefore, (54) can be solved via fixed point methods. One can proceed further to determine the
adjoint processes and the explicit optimal team strategy. This is done in the next subsection.
A. Communication Channels with Memory and Feedback
In this section we discuss applications of team games to communication channels with feed-
back and memory. We consider applications in which the state process is a RV, and decentralized
information structures with feedback and/or correlation among them. Consider a filtered proba-
bility space
(
Ω,F,FT ,P
)
on which the following are defined.
A Gaussian RV θ △= V ector{θ1, . . . , θN} : Ω −→ Rn, θi ∈ Rni, (E(θ), Cov(θ)) = (θ¯, P0),
Mutual Independent Brownian motions Bi : [0, T ]× Ω→ Rki, i = 1, . . . N, independent of θ.
The information structure of each DM ui is Gy
i
0,t
△
= σ{yi(s) : 0 ≤ s ≤ t}, t ∈ [0, T ], i =
1, . . . , N , which is defined by a communication channel with memory feedback via the stochastic
differential equation
yi(t) =
∫ t
o
Cii(s, y
i(s))θds+
∫ t
0
D
1
2
ii(s)dB
i(s), t ∈ [0, T ], i = 1, 2, . . . , N, (55)
where Cii : [0, T ] × Rki −→ L(Rn,Rki). The communication channel (55) models a Gaussian
Broadcast channel in which there is a single transmitter and multiple receivers, i = 1, . . . , N . The
transmitter wishes to send linear combinations of messages {θ1, . . . , θN} to receivers {y1, . . . , yN}.
The objective is to reconstruct at each receiver yi the intended linear combination of the
messages denoted by Liθ, where Li is an appropriately chosen matrix. A reasonable pay-
off for reconstructing the intended linear combination Liθ at receiver i by ui is the average
weighted estimation error E
∫
[0,T ]
〈ut−diag{L
1, . . . , LN}θ, R(t)(ut−diag{L
1, . . . , LN}θ)〉dt. A
more general pay-off which also incorporates any power constraints at the transmitter is the
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quadratic pay-off defined by
J(u1, . . . , uN)
△
=
1
2
E
{∫ T
0
(
〈ut, R(t)u〉+ 〈θ,H(t)θ〉+ 〈θ, F (t)〉
+ 〈ut, E(t)θ〉+ 〈ut, m(t)〉
)
dt. (56)
Noticed that the information structures (55) are defined via channels with feedback since
P
{
yi(t) ∈ Ai|{y
i(s) : 0 ≤ s ≤ t− ǫ}, θ
}
6= P
{
yi(t) ∈ Ai|θ
}
, Ai ∈ B(R
ki), ǫ > 0, i ∈ ZN . (57)
The previous communication model can be easily generalized to other network communication
channels.
Since minimizing (56) over feedback information structures subject to (55) is a team problem,
then we will apply the optimality conditions of Theorem 2.
First, note that the stochastic differential equation (55) has a continuous strong solution which
is unique. Since the state is a RV (static state), then ψo = 0, hence the optimal strategies are
given component wise by
u
i,o
t = −R
−1
ii (t)
{ N∑
j=1
Eij(t)E
(
θj |Gy
i
0,t
)
+mi(t) +
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
Rij(t)E
(
u
j,o
t |G
yi
0,t
)}
, P|
G
yi
0,t
− a.s., i ∈ ZN .
(58)
Define the filter version of θ by θ̂i(t) △= E
(
θ|Gy
i,o
0,t
)
, t ∈ [0, T ], i ∈ ZN . Then these bank of filters
satisfy the following stochastic differential equations
dθ̂i(t) = P i(t, yi)C∗ii(t, y
i(t))D−1ii (t)
(
dyi(t)− Cii(t, y
i(t))θ̂i(t)dt
)
, θ̂i(0) = θ, t ∈ (0, T ], i ∈ ZN
(59)
P˙ i(t, yi) = −P i(t, yi)C∗ii(t, y
i(t))D−1ii (t)Cii(t, y
i(t))P i(t, yi), P (0) = P 0, t ∈ (0, T ], i ∈ ZN .
(60)
Define the innovations process and the σ−algebra generated by it as follows.
I i(t)
△
=
∫ t
0
D
1
2
,−1
ii (s)
(
yi(s)− Cii(s, y
i(s))θ̂i(s)ds
)
, t ∈ [0, T ], i ∈ ZN , (61)
GI
i
0,t
△
= σ
{
I i(s) : 0 ≤ s ≤ t
}
, t ∈ [0, T ], i ∈ ZN . (62)
Then {I i(t) : 0 ≤ t ≤ T} is an
(
Gy
i
T ,P
)
−adapted Brownian motion ∀i ∈ ZN , and for i 6= j,
the innovations I i(·), Ij(·) are independent (in view of independence of Bi(·), Bj(·) for i 6= j).
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Moreover, the processes {θ̂i, P i(t, yi), yi(t) : 0 ≤ t ≤ T} are weak solutions [38] of the system
dθ̂i(t) = P i(t, yi)C∗ii(t, y
i(t))N−1ii (t)dI
i(t), θ̂i(0) = θ, t ∈ (0, T ], i ∈ ZN (63)
dyi(t) = Cii(t, y
i(t))θ̂i(t)dt+D
1
2
ii(t)dI
i(t), t ∈ [0, T ], i ∈ ZN , (64)
P˙ i(t, yi) = −P i(t, yi)C∗ii(t, y
i(t))D−1ii (t)Cii(t, y
i(t))P i(t, yi), P (0) = P 0, t ∈ (0, T ], i ∈ ZN .
(65)
Next, we establish existence of strong solutions to the system (63)-(65) which will imply that
Gy
i
T and GI
i
T , ∀i ∈ ZN generate the same information. Under assumption that Cii(t, yi) satisfy the
Lipschitz and linear growth conditions, uniformly in t ∈ [0, T ], the system (63), (64) has a unique
GI
i
T −adapted continuous solution [38], hence θ̂i(·) is GI
i
0,t−measurable, ∀t ∈ [0, T ], ∀i ∈ ZN .
Thus, Gy
i
0,t ⊆ G
Ii
0,t, ∀t ∈ [0, T ], ∀i ∈ ZN . The reverse GI
i
0,t ⊆ G
yi
0,T , ∀t ∈ [0, T ], ∀i ∈ ZN follows
from the construction of innovations processes (61). Hence, GIiT = Gy
i
T , ∀i ∈ ZN . Since each
DM ui is Gy
i
T = G
Ii
T −adapted ∀i ∈ ZN , and the innovations sigma algebras GI
i
T are independent
for ∀i, j ∈ ZN , i 6= j then the optimal strategies (58) are given by
u
i,o
t = −R
−1
ii (t)
{
E[i](t)θ̂i(t) +mi(t) +
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
Rij(t)E
(
u
j,o
t
)}
, P|
G
yi
0,t
− a.s., i ∈ ZN . (66)
Next, we determine the vector by uo △= V ector{E(u1,o),E(u2,ot ), . . . ,E(uN,ot )}. Taking expecta-
tion of both sides of (66) gives the following linear system of equations.
u
i,o
t (t) = −R
−1
ii (t)
{
E[i](t)E
(
θ
)
+mi(t) +
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
Rij(t)u
j,o
t (t)
}
, i ∈ ZN . (67)
The last equation can be put into a fixed point form. Define
M(t)
△
=


−R−111 (t)E
[1](t)E
(
θ
)
−R−122 (t)E
[2](t)E
(
θ
)
. . .
. . .
−R−1NN (t)E
[N ](t)E
(
θ
)


, K(t)
△
=


−R−111 (t)m
1(t)
−R−122 (t)m
2(t)
. . .
. . .
−R−1NN (t)m
N(t)


, (68)
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Λ(t)
△
=


I R−111 (t)R12(t) R
−1
11 (t)R13(t) . . . R
−1
11 (t)R1N (t)
R−122 (t)R21(t) I R
−1
22 (t)R23(t) . . . R
−1
22 (t)R2N (t)
. . . . . . I . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
R−1NN (t)RN1(t) R
−1
NN(t)RN2(t) R
−1
NN (t)RN3(t) . . . I


(69)
From (67), we have
Λ(t)uo(t) = M(t) +K(t), uo(t) = Λ−1(t)
(
M(t) +K(t)
)
, t ∈ [0, T ], if Λ(t) > 0, ∀t ∈ [0, T ].(70)
Finally, the optimal strategies are given by (66) and (70).
The previous calculations can be generalized to other channel models. Moreover, θ can be
extended to a Random process described by Itoˆ stochastic differential equations. For linear
dynamics this generalization is a straight forward repetition of the previous calculations, hence
it is omitted.
B. Linear-Quadratic Form and Linear Stochastic Differential Dynamics
In this section we invoke the minimum principle to compute the optimal strategies, with respect
to a quadratic pay-off, for distributed stochastic dynamical decision systems consisting of an
interconnection of two subsystems, each governed by a linear stochastic differential equation
with coupling.
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Subsystem Dynamics 1:
dx1(t) =A11(t)x
1(t)dt+B11(t)u
1
tdt+G11(t)dW
1(t)
+ A12(t)x
2(t)dt +B12(t)u
2
tdt, x
1(0) = x10, t ∈ (0, T ], (71)
Subsystem Dynamics 2:
dx2(t) =A22(t)x
2(t)dt+B22(t)u
2
tdt+G22(t)dW
2(t)
+ A21(t)x
1(t)dt +B21u
1
tdt, x
2(0) = x20, t ∈ (0, T ] (72)
For any t ∈ [0, T ] the feedback information structure of u1t of subsystem 1 is the σ−algebra
Gy
1,u
0,t
△
= σ{y1(s) : 0 ≤ s ≤ t}, and the feedback information structure of u2t of subsystem 2 is
the σ−algebra Gy
2,u
0,t
△
= σ{y2(s) : 0 ≤ s ≤ t}. These information structures are defined by the
following linear observation equations.
Information structure of Local Control u1:
y1(t) =
∫ t
0
C11(s)x
1(s)ds+
∫ t
0
D
1
2
11(s)dB
1(s), t ∈ [0, T ]. (73)
Information structure of Local Control u2:
y2(t) =
∫ t
0
C22(s)x
2(s)ds+
∫ t
0
D
1
2
22(s)dB
2(s), t ∈ [0, T ]. (74)
We may also assume the DMs strategies u1 and u2 are functionals of the innovations information
structures GI
1,u
0,t
△
= σ{I1(s) : 0 ≤ s ≤ t}, GI
2,u
0,t
△
= σ{I1(s) : 0 ≤ s ≤ t} defined by the innovations
processes of (73), (74), respectively.
The pay-off or reward is quadratic in (x1, x2, u1, u2).
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Pay-off Functional:
J(u1, u2) =
1
2
E
{∫ T
0
[
〈

 x1(t)
x2(t)

 , H(t)

 x1(t)
x2(t)

〉+ 〈

 u1t
u2t

 , R(t)

 u1t
u2t

〉]dt
+ 〈

 x1(T )
x2(T )

 ,M(T )

 x1(T )
x2(T )

〉}. (75)
We assume that the initial condition x(0), the system Brownian motion {W (t) : t ∈ [0, T ]}, and
the observations Brownian motion {B1(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]}, and {B2(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]} are mutually
independent and x(0) is Gaussian (E(x(0)), Cov(x(0))) = (x¯0, P0).
For decentralized filtering we set u1 = 0, u2 = 0 in the right hand sides of (71), (72), but we
should take as pay-off (56).
Define the augmented variables by
x
△
=

 x1
x2

 , y △=

 y1
y2

 , u △=

 u1
u2

 , ψ △=

 ψ1
ψ2

 , q11 △=

 q111
q211

 ,
W
△
=

 W 1
W 2

 , B △=

 B1
B2

 ,
and matrices by
A
△
=

 A11 A12
A21 A22

 , B △=

 B11 B12
B21 B22

 , C △=

 C11 0
0 C22

 ,
B(1)
△
=

 B11
B21

 , B(2) △=

 B12
B22

 , C [1] △= [ C11 0 ] , C [2] △= [ 0 C22 ] ,
G
△
=

 G11 0
0 G22

 , D 12 △=

 D 1211 0
0 D
1
2
22

 .
The distributed system is described in compact form by
dx(t) =A(t)x(t)dt +B(t)utdt+G(t)dW (t), x(0) = x0 t ∈ [0, T ], (76)
dy(t) =C(t)x(t)dt+D
1
2 (t)dB(t), t ∈ [0, T ]. (77)
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while the pay-off is expressed by
J(u1, u2) =
1
2
E
{∫ T
0
[
〈x(t), H(t)x(t)〉+ 〈ut, R(t)ut〉
]
dt+ 〈x(T ),M(T )x(T )〉
}
. (78)
By Theorem 2, the Hamiltonian is given by
H(t, x, ψ, q11, u) = 〈A(t)x+Bu, ψ〉+ tr(q
∗
11G(t)) +
1
2
〈x,H(t)x〉+
1
2
〈u,R(t)u〉. (79)
The derivative of the Hamiltonian with respect to u component wise this is given by
Hu1(t, x, ψ,Q, u
1, u2) = B(1),∗(t)ψ(t) +R11(t)u
1 +R12(t)u
2, (80)
Hu2(t, x, ψ,Q, u
1, u2) = B(2),∗(t)ψ(t) +R22(t)u
2 +R21(t)u
1. (81)
The optimal decision {uot = (u
1,o
t , u
2.o
t ) : 0 ≤ t ≤ T} is obtained from (80), (81) by using the
information structure available to each DM.
Let (xo(·), ψo(·), qo11(·), qo12(·)) denote the solutions of the Hamiltonian system, corresponding
to the optimal control uo, then
dxo(t) =A(t)xo(t)dt+B(t)uotdt+G(t)dW (t), x
o(0) = x0 (82)
dψo(t) =−A∗(t)ψo(t)dt−H(t)xo(t)dt− Vqo
11
(t)dt
+ qo11(t)dW (t) + q
o
12(t)dB(t), ψ
o(T ) = M(T )xo(T ) (83)
Next, we identify the martingale term in (83). Let {Φ(t, s) : 0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T} denote the transition
operator of A(·) and Φ∗(·, ·) that of the adjoint A∗(·) of A(·). Then {ψo(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]} is given
by
ψo(t) =Φ∗(T, t)M(T )xo(T ) +
∫ T
t
Φ∗(s, t)
{
H(s)xo(s)ds+ Vqo
11
(s)ds
− qo11(s)dW (s)− q
o
12(s)dB(s)
}
. (84)
By using the using the identity ∂
∂s
Φ∗(t, s) = −A∗(s)Φ∗(t, s), 0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T one can verify
by differentiation that (84) is a solution of (ψo(·), qo11(·), qo12(·)) governed by (83). Since for any
control policy, {xo(s) : 0 ≤ t ≤ s ≤ T} is uniquely determined from (82) and its current value
xo(t), then (84) can be expressed via
ψo(t) = Σ(t)xo(t) + βo(t), t ∈ [0, T ], (85)
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where Σ(·), βo(·) determine the operators to the one expressed via (84).
Next, we determine the operators (Σ(·), βo(·)). Applying the Itoˆ differential rule to both sides
of (85), and then using (82), (83) we obtain
−A∗(t)ψo(t)dt−H(t)xo(t)dt− Vqo
11
(t)dt + qo11(t)dW (t) + q
o
12(t)dB(t)
=Σ˙(t)xo(t)dt+ Σ(t)
{
A(t)xo(t)dt +B(t)uotdt+G(t)dW (t)
}
+ dβo(t). (86)
Substituting the claimed relation (85) into (86) we obtained the identity{
−A∗(t)Σ(t)− Σ(t)A(t)−H(t)− Σ˙(t)
}
xo(t)dt− Vqo
11
(t)dt+ qo11(t)dW (t) + q
o
12(t)dB(t)
=A∗(t)βo(t)dt+ Σ(t)B(t)uotdt+ Σ(t)G(t)dW (t) + dβ
o(t). (87)
Since σ(t, x) = G(t), then Vqo
11
(t) = 0, ∀t ∈ [0, T ]. By matching the intensity of the martingale
terms {·}dW (t) in (87), and the rest of the terms we obtain the following equations.
Vqo
11
(t) = 0, ∀t ∈ [0, T ], (88)
qo11(t) = Σ(t)G(t), t ∈ [0, T ], (89)
Σ˙(t) + A∗(t)Σ(t) + Σ(t)A(t) +H(t) = 0, t ∈ [0, T ), Σ(T ) = M(T ), (90)
dβo(t) + A∗(t)βo(t)dt+ Σ(t)B(t)uotdt− q
o
12(t)dB(t) = 0, t ∈ [0, T ), β
o(T ) = 0. (91)
Notice that qo12 is also obtained by Remark 3, since qo12(t) = ψox(t)G(t) = Σ(t)G(t), ∀t ∈ [0, T ].
By Theorem 2, {(u1,ot , u
2,o
t ) : 0 ≤ t ≤ T} obtained from (80) and (81), are given by
E
{
Hu1(t, x
1,o(t), x2,o(t), ψ1,o(t), ψ2,o(t), q1,o11 (t), q
2,o
11 (t), u
1,o
t , u
2,0
t )|G
y1,u
o
0,t
}
= 0,
a.e.t ∈ [0, T ], P|
G
y1,u
o
0,t
− a.s. (92)
E
{
Hu2(t, x
1,o(t), x2,o(t), ψ1,o(t), ψ2,o(t), q1,o11 (t), q
2,o
11 (t), u
1,o
t , u
2,0
t )|G
y2,u
o
0,t
}
= 0,
a.e.t ∈ [0, T ], P|
G
y2,u
o
0,t
− a.s. (93)
where (xo(·), ψo(·), qo11(·)) ≡ (x1,o(·), x2,o(·), ψ1,o(·), ψ2,o(·), q
1,o
11 (·)), q
2,o
11 (·)) are solutions of the
Hamiltonian system (82), (83) corresponding to uo. From (92), (93) the optimal decisions are
u
1,o
t = −R
−1
11 (t)B
(1),∗(t)E
{
ψo(t)|Gy
1,uo
0,t
}
−R−111 (t)R12(t)E
{
u
2,o
t |G
y1,u
o
0,t
}
, t ∈ [0, T ]. (94)
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u
2,o
t = −R
−1
22 (t)B
(2),∗(t)E
{
ψo(t)|Gy
2,uo
0,t
}
− R−122 (t)R21(t)E
{
u
1,o
t |G
y2,u
o
0,t
}
. t ∈ [0, T ]. (95)
Clearly, the previous equations illustrate the coupling between the two subsystems, since u1,o is
estimating the optimal decision of the other subsystem u2,o as well as the adjoint processes ψo
from its own observations, and vice-versa.
Let φ(·) be any square integrable and FT−adapted matrix-valued process or scalar-valued
processes, and define its filtered and predictor versions by
πi(φ)(t)
△
= E
{
φ(t)|Gy
i
0,t
}
, πi(φ)(s, t)
△
= E
{
φ(s)|Gy
i
0,t
}
, t ∈ [0, T ], s ≥ t, i = 1, 2.
For any admissible decision u and corresponding (x(·), ψ(·) define their filter versions with
respect to Gy
i
0,t for i = 1, 2, by
πi(x)(t)
△
=

 E
{
x1(t)|Gy
i,u
0,t
}
E
{
x2(t)|Gy
i,u
0,t
}

 , πi(ψ)(t) △=

 E
{
ψ1(t)|Gy
i,u
0,t
}
E
{
ψ2(t)|Gy
i,u
0,t
}

 , t ∈ [0, T ], i = 1, 2,
πi(u)(t)
△
=

 E
{
u1t |G
yi,u
0,t
}
E
{
u2t |G
yi,u
0,t
}

 ≡

 û1,it
û
2,i
t

 , t ∈ [0, T ], i = 1, 2,
and their predictor versions by
πi(x)(s, t)
△
=

 E
{
x1(s)|Gy
i,u
0,t
}
E
{
x2(s)|Gy
i,u
0,t
}

 , πi(ψ)(s, t) △=

 E
{
ψ1(s)|Gy
i,u
0,t
}
E
{
ψ2(s)|Gy
i,u
0,t
}

 , t ∈ [0, T ], s ≥ t, i = 1, 2.
πi(u)(s, t)
△
=

 E
{
u1s|G
yi,u
0,t
}
E
{
u2s|G
yi,u
0,t
}

 , t ∈ [0, T ], s ≥ t, i = 1, 2,
From (94), (95) the optimal decisions are
u
1,o
t ≡ −R
−1
11 (t)B
(1),∗(t)π1(ψo)(t)−R−111 (t)R12(t)E
{
u
2,o
t |G
y1,u
o
0,t
}
, t ∈ [0, T ], (96)
u
2,o
t ≡ −R
−1
22 (t)B
(2),∗(t)π2(ψo)(t)−R−122 (t)R21(t)E
{
u
1,o
t |G
y2,u
o
0,t
}
, t ∈ [0, T ]. (97)
The previous optimal decisions require the conditional estimates
{(π1(ψo)(t), π2(ψo)(t)) : 0 ≤ t ≤ T}. These are obtained by taking conditional expectations of
(84) giving
πi(ψo)(t) = Φ∗(T, t)M(T )πi(xo)(T, t) +
∫ T
t
Φ∗(s, t)H(s)πi(xo)(s, t)ds, t ∈ [0, T ], i = 1, 2.
(98)
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For any admissible decision, the filtered versions of x(·) are given by the following stochastic
differential equations [38].
dπ1(x)(t) = A(t)π1(x)(t)dt +B(1)(t)u1tdt+B
(2)(t)π1(u2)(t)dt+
{
π1(xx∗)(t)
− π1(x)(t)π1(x∗)(t)
}
C [1],∗D−111
(
dy1(t)− C [1](t)π1(x)(t)dt
)
, π1(x)(0) = x¯0, (99)
dπ2(x)(t) = A(t)π2(x)(t)dt +B(2)(t)u2tdt+B
(1)(t)π2(u1)(t)dt+
{
π2(xx∗)(t)
− π2(x)(t)π2(x∗)(t)
}
C [2],∗D−122 (t)
(
dy2(t)− C [2](t)π2(x)(t)dt
)
, π2(x)(0) = x¯0. (100)
From the previous filtered versions of x(·) it is clear that subsystem 1 estimates the actions of
subsystem 2 based on its own observations, namely, π1(u2)(·) and subsystem 2 estimates the
actions of subsystem 1 based on its own observations, namely, π2(u1)(·).
For any admissible decision (u1, u2) ∈ U(2),y
u
reg [0, T ] define the innovation processes associated
with {Gy
i,u
0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]}, i = 1, 2 and the σ−algebras generated by them as follows
I i(t)
△
= yi(t)−
∫ t
0
C [i](s)πi(x)(s)ds, GI
i,u
0,t
△
= σ
{
I i(s) : 0 ≤ s ≤ t
}
, t ∈ [0, T ], i = 1, 2.(101)
Let I i,o(t) the innovations processes corresponding to where (xo, uo), i = 1, 2. Then by (101),
{I i(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]} is
(
{Gy
i,u
0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]},P
)
− adapted Brownian motion, I i(t) has covariance
Cov(I i(t))
△
=
∫ t
0
Dii(s)ds, for i = 1, 2 and {I1(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]}, {I2(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]} are
independent.
For any admissible decision u the predicted versions of x(·) are obtained from (99) and (100)
as follows. Utilizing the identity πi(x)(s, t) = E
{
E
{
x(s)|Gy
i,u
0,s
}
|Gy
i,u
0,t
}
= E
{
πi(x)(s)|Gy
i,u
0,t
}
,
for 0 ≤ t ≤ s ≤ T then
dπ1(x)(s, t) = A(s)π1(x)(s, t)ds+B(1)(s)π1(u1)(s, t)ds+B(2)(s)π1(u2)(s, t)ds, t < s ≤ T,
(102)
π1(x)(t, t) = π1(x)(t), t ∈ [0, T ), (103)
dπ2(x)(s, t) = A(s)π2(x)(s, t)ds+B(2)(s)π2(u1)(s, t)ds+B(1)(s)π2(u1)(s, t)ds, t < s ≤ T,
(104)
π2(x)(t, t) = π2(x)(t), t ∈ [0, T ). (105)
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Since for a given admissible policy and observation paths, {π1(x)(s, t) : 0 ≤ t ≤ s ≤ T} is
determined from (102) and its current value π1(xo)(t, t) = π1(x)(t), and {π2(x)(s, t) : 0 ≤ t ≤
s ≤ T} is determined from (104) , and its current value π2(x)(t, t) = π2(x)(t), then (98) can
be expressed via
πi(ψo)(t) = Ki(t)πi(xo)(t) + ri(t), t ∈ [0, T ], i = 1, 2. (106)
where Ki(·), ri(·) determines the operators to the one expressed via (98), for i = 1, 2. Utilizing
(106) into (96) and (97) then
u
1,o
t ≡ −R
−1
11 (t)B
(1),∗(t)
{
K1(t)π1(xo)(t) + r1(t)
}
−R−111 (t)R12(t)π
1(u2,ot )(t), t ∈ [0, T ],
(107)
u
2,o
t ≡ −R
−1
22 (t)B
(2),∗(t)
{
K2(t)π2(xo)(t) + r2(t)
}
−R−122 (t)R21(t)π
2(u1,o)(t), t ∈ [0, T ].
(108)
Let {ΨKi(t, s) : 0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T} denote the transition operator of AKi(t)
△
=
(
A(t) −
B(i)(t)R−1ii (t)B
(i),∗(t)Ki(t)
)
, for i = 1, 2.
Next, we determine Ki(·), ri(·), i = 1, 2. Substituting the previous equations into (102), (103)
and (104), (105) then
π1(xo)(s, t) =ΨK1(s, t)π
1(xo)(t)−
∫ s
t
ΨK1(s, τ)B
(1)(τ)R−111 (τ)B
(1),∗(τ)r1(τ)dτ
−
∫ s
t
ΨK1(s, τ)B
(1)(τ)R−111 (τ)R12(τ)π
1(u2,o)(τ, t)dτ
+
∫ s
t
ΨK1(s, τ)B
(2)(τ)π1(u2,o)(τ, t)dτ, t ≤ s ≤ T, (109)
π2(xo)(s, t) =ΨK2(s, t)π
2(xo)(t)−
∫ s
t
ΨK2(s, τ)B
(2)(τ)R−122 (τ)B
(2),∗(τ)r2(τ)dτ
−
∫ s
t
ΨK2(s, τ)B
(2)(τ)R−122 (τ)R21(τ)π
2(u1,o)(τ, t)dτ
+
∫ s
t
ΨK2(s, τ)B
(1)(τ)π2(u1,o)(τ, t)dτ, t ≤ s ≤ T. (110)
We now introduce the following assumption regarding the measurability of admissible decisions
Uy
i,u
[0, T ], i = 1, 2.
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Assumptions 5. Any admissible decentralized feedback information structure ui ∈ Uyi,u [0, T ] is
adapted to
{
GI
i,u
0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]
}
, i = 1, 2, and (99) has a strong
{
GI
1,u
0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]
}
− adapted
solution π1(x)(·) and (100) has a strong
{
GI
2,u
0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]
}
− adapted solution π2(x)(·).
Now, we can state the first main result.
Theorem 4. Under the conditions of Assumptions 5 the optimal decisions (u1,o, u2,o) are given
u
1,o
t ≡ −R
−1
11 (t)B
(1),∗(t)
{
K1(t)π1(xo)(t) + r1(t)
}
− R−111 (t)R12(t)u
2,o(t), t ∈ [0, T ], (111)
u
2,o
t ≡ −R
−1
22 (t)B
(2),∗(t)
{
K2(t)π2(xo)(t) + r2(t)
}
− R−122 (t)R21(t)u
1,o(t), t ∈ [0, T ]. (112)
where πi(xo)(·), i = 1, 2 satisfy the filter equations (99), (100), and
(
Ki(·), ri(·), xo(·), ui,o(·)
)
, i =
1, 2 are solutions of the ordinary differential equations (113), (114), (115), (116), (117), (118).
K˙i(t) + A∗(t)Ki(t) +Ki(t)A(t)−Ki(t)B(i)(t)R−1ii (t)B
(i),∗(t)Ki(t)
+H(t) = 0, t ∈ [0, T ), i = 1, 2, (113)
Ki(T ) = M(T ), i = 1, 2, (114)
r˙1(t) =
{
− A∗(t) + Φ∗(T, t)M(T )ΨK1(T, t)B
(1)(t)R−111 (t)B
(1),∗(t)
+
(∫ T
t
Φ∗(s, t)H(s)ΨK1(s, t)ds
)
B(1)(t)R−111 (t)B
(1),∗(t)
}
r1(t)
−
(∫ T
t
Φ∗(s, t)H(s)ΨK1(s, t)ds
)(
B(2)(t)−B(1)(t)R−111 (t)R12(t)
)
u2,o(t),
− Φ∗(T, t)M(T )ΨK1(T, t)
(
B(2)(t)− B(1)(t)R−111 (t)R12(t)
)
u2,o(t) t ∈ [0, T ), r1(T ) = 0,
(115)
r˙2(t) =
{
− A∗(t) + Φ∗(T, t)M(T )ΨK2(T, t)B
(2)(t)R−122 (t)B
(2),∗(t)
+
(∫ T
t
Φ∗(s, t)H(s)ΨK2(s, t)ds
)
B(2)(t)R−122 (t)B
(2),∗(t)
}
r2(t)
−
(∫ T
t
Φ∗(s, t)H(s)ΨK2(s, t)ds
)(
B(1)(t)−B(2)(t)R−122 (t)R21(t)
)
u1,o(t)
− Φ∗(T, t)M(T )ΨK2(T, t)
(
B(1)(t)− B(2)(t)R−122 (t)R21(t)
)
u1,o(t), t ∈ [0, T ), r2(T ) = 0,
(116)
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x˙o(t) = A(t)xo(t) +B(1)(t)u1,o(t) +B(2)(t)u2,o(t), xo(0) = x0, (117)

 u1,o(t)
u2,o(t)

 = −

 I R−111 (t)R12(t)
R−122 (t)R21(t) I


−1
 R−111 (t)B(1),∗(t)
{
K1(t)xo(t) + r1(t)
}
R−122 (t)B
(2),∗(t)
{
K2(t)xo(t) + r2(t)
}

 .(118)
Proof: By invoking Assumptions 5, since yi(t) = ∫ t
0
C [i](s)π(x)(s)ds+ I i(t), and πi(x)(·)
is a strong solution then Gy
i,u
0,t ⊆ G
Ii,u
0,t , ∀t ∈ [0, T ] and thus G
yi,u
0,t = G
Ii,u
0,t , i = 1, 2. Hence,
the optimality conditions of Theorem 2 are valid. Utilizing the independence of the innovations
processes I1(·) and I2(·) then
π1(u2)(s, t) = E
(
u2s|G
y1
0,t
)
= E
(
u2s
)
≡ u2(s), t ≤ s ≤ T, (119)
π2(u1)(s, t) = E
(
u1s|G
y2
0,t
)
= E
(
u1s
)
≡ u1(s), t ≤ s ≤ T. (120)
Substituting (119), (120) into (109), (110), and then (109), (110) into (98) we have
π1(ψo)(t) =
{
Φ∗(T, t)M(T )ΨK1(T, t) +
∫ T
t
Φ∗(s, t)H(s)ΨK1(s, t)ds
}
π1(xo)(t)
+ Φ∗(T, t)M(T )
∫ T
t
ΨK1(T, τ)
(
B(2)(τ)− B(1)(τ)R−111 (τ)R12(τ)
)
u2,o(τ)dτ
+
∫ T
t
Φ∗(s, t)H(s)
∫ s
t
ΨK1(s, τ)
(
B(2)(τ)− B(1)(τ)R−111 (τ)R12(τ)
)
u2,o(τ)dτds
− Φ∗(T, t)M(T )
∫ T
t
ΨK1(T, τ)B
(1)(τ)R−111 (τ)B
(1),∗(τ)r1(τ)dτ
−
∫ T
t
Φ∗(s, t)H(s)
∫ s
t
ΨK1(s, τ)B
(1)(τ)R−111 (τ)B
(1),∗(τ)r1(τ)dτds, (121)
π2(ψo)(t) =
{
Φ∗(T, t)M(T )ΨK2(T, t) +
∫ T
t
Φ∗(s, t)H(s)ΨK2(s, t)ds
}
π2(xo)(t)
+ Φ∗(T, t)M(T )
∫ T
t
ΨK2(T, τ)
(
B(1)(τ)− B(2)(τ)R−122 (τ)R21(τ)
)
u1,o(τ)dτ
+
∫ T
t
Φ∗(s, t)H(s)
∫ s
t
ΨK2(s, τ)
(
B(1)(τ)− B(2)(τ)R−122 (τ)R21(τ)
)
u1,o(τ)dτds
− Φ∗(T, t)M(T )
∫ T
t
ΨK2(T, τ)B
(2)(τ)R−122 (τ)B
(2),∗(τ)r2(τ)dτ
−
∫ T
t
Φ∗(s, t)H(s)
∫ s
t
ΨK2(s, τ)B
(2)(τ)R−122 (τ)B
(2),∗(τ)r2(τ)dτds. (122)
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Comparing (106) with the previous two equations then Ki(·), i = 1, 2 are identified by the
operators
Ki(t) = Φ∗(T, t)M(T )ΨKi(T, t) +
∫ T
t
Φ∗(s, t)H(s)ΨKi(s, t)ds, t ∈ [0, T ], i = 1, 2,
(123)
and ri(·), i = 1, 2 by the processes
r1(t) =Φ∗(T, t)M(T )
∫ T
t
ΨK1(T, τ)
(
B(2)(τ)− B(1)(τ)R−111 (τ)R12(τ)
)
u2,o(τ)dτ
+
∫ T
t
Φ∗(s, t)H(s)
∫ s
t
ΨK1(s, τ)
(
B(2)(τ)−B(1)(τ)R−111 (τ)R12(τ)
)
u2,o(τ)dτds
− Φ∗(T, t)M(T )
∫ T
t
ΨK1(T, τ)B
(1)(τ)R−111 (τ)B
(1),∗(τ)r1(τ)dτ
−
∫ T
t
Φ∗(s, t)H(s)
∫ s
t
ΨK1(s, τ)B
(1)(τ)R−111 (τ)B
(1),∗(τ)r1(τ)dτds, (124)
r2(t) =Φ∗(T, t)M(T )
∫ T
t
ΨK2(T, τ)
(
B(1)(τ)− B(2)(τ)R−122 (τ)R21(τ)
)
u1,o(τ)dτ
+
∫ T
t
Φ∗(s, t)H(s)
∫ s
t
ΨK2(s, τ)
(
B(1)(τ)−B(2)(τ)R−122 (τ)R21(τ)
)
u1,o(τ)dτds
− Φ∗(T, t)M(T )
∫ T
t
ΨK2(T, τ)B
(2)(τ)R−122 (τ)B
(2),∗(τ)r2(τ)dτ
−
∫ T
t
Φ∗(s, t)H(s)
∫ s
t
ΨK2(s, τ)B
(2)(τ)R−122 (τ)B
(2),∗(τ)r2(τ)dτds. (125)
Differentiating both sides of (123) the operators Ki(·), i = 1, 2 satisfy the following matrix
differential equations (113), (114). Differentiating both sides of (124), (125) the processes
ri(·), i = 1, 2 satisfy the differential equations (115), (116). Utilizing (119), (120) we obtain
the optimal strategies (111), (112). Next, we determine ui,o for i = 1, 2 from (111), (112).
Define the averages
x(t)
△
= E
{
x(t)
}
= E
{
πi(x)(t)
}
, i = 1, 2. (126)
Then xo(·) satisfies the ordinary differential equation (117). Taking the expectation of both sides
of (111), (112) we deduce the corresponding equations
u1,o(t) = −R−111 (t)B
(1),∗(t)
{
K1(t)xo(t) + r1(t)
}
−R−111 (t)R12(t)u
2,o(t), t ∈ [0, T ], (127)
u2,o(t) = −R−122 (t)B
(2),∗(t)
{
K2(t)xo(t) + r2(t)
}
−R−122 (t)R21(t)u
1,o(t), t ∈ [0, T ]. (128)
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The last two equations can be written in matrix form (118). This completes the derivation.
Hence, the optimal strategies are computed from (111), (112), where the filter equations for
πi(xo)(·), i = 1, 2 satisfy (99), (100), while
(
Ki(·), ri(·), ui,o(·), xo(·)
)
, i = 1, 2 are computed
off-line utilizing the ordinary differential equations (113), (114), (115), (116), (117), (118).
It is important to make the following observations.
(O1): The optimal strategies or laws (111), (112) are precisely the optimal strategies obtained
in [39] for noiseless decentralized information structures. This property is analogous to that of
optimal centralized strategies of fully and partially observed Linear-Quadratic-Gaussian systems.
(O2): The filter equations for πi(xo)(·), i = 1, 2 given by (99), (100) are nonlinear and may
require higher order moments, leading to the so-called moment closure problem of nonlinear
filtering. Furher analysis is required to determine whether the conditional error covariance in
(99), (100) have the Kalman filter form.
Next, we state analogous results for distributed filtering problems.
Corollary 2. Consider distributed filter dynamics (71), (72) with B(i) = 0, i = 1, 2 and LQF
pay-off (49).
Then the optimal strategies (u1,o, u2,o) are given by
u
i,o
t =− R
−1
ii (t)
{
mi(t) +
2∑
j=1
Eij(t)E
(
xj(t)|Gy
i
0,t
)
+
2∑
j=1,j 6=i
Rij(t)E
(
u
j,o
t
)}
, P|
G
yi
0,t
− a.s., ∀i ∈ Z2,
(129)
where x̂i(t) = V ector
{
E{x1(t)|Gy
i
0,t},E{x
2(t)|Gy
i
0,t}
}
, i = 1, 2 satisfy the linear Kalman filter
equations
dx̂1(t) =A(t)x̂1(t)dt + P 1(t)C [1],∗D−111 (t)
(
dy1(t)− C [1](t)x̂1(t)dt
)
, x̂(0) = x¯0, (130)
dx̂2(t) =A(t)x̂2(t)dt + P 2(t)C [2],∗D−122 (t)
(
dy2(t)− C [2](t)x̂2(t)dt
)
, x̂o(0) = x¯0, (131)
P˙ i(t) =A(t)P i(t) + P i(t)A(t)− P 2(t)C [i],∗(t)D−1ii (t)C
[i](t)P 2(t)
+G(t)G∗(t), P i(0) = P i0, i = 1, 2. (132)
and u(t) △= V ector
{
E{u1t},E{u
2
t}
}
satisfy the equations
R(t)uo(t) + E(t)x(t) +m(t) = 0,
d
dt
x(t) = Ax(t), x(0) = x0. (133)
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Proof: (129) is obtained from (53) by setting B(i) = 0, N = 2, and the discussion in Sec-
tion V-A (for filtering problems the observations and innovations generate the same filtrations).
The filters (130)-(132) are follow from the linear and Gaussian nature of the state and observation
equations. Taking expectation of both sides of (129) yields (133).
Finally, we state a remark describing extensions of the previous examples.
Remark 4. Theorem 4 is easily generalized to the following arbitrary coupled dynamics
dxi(t) =Aii(t)x
i(t)dt+B(i)uitdt+GiidW
i(t)
+
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
Aijx
j(t)dt +
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
B(j)(t)ujtdt, x
i(0) = xi0, t ∈ (0, T ], i ∈ ZN (134)
and information structures generated by observation equations with feedback
yi =
∫ t
0
Cii(s, y
i(s))x(s)ds+
∫ t
0
D
1
2
ii(s)dB
i(s), t ∈ [0, T ], i ∈ ZN . (135)
The optimal strategies are extensions of the ones given in Theorem 4. Similarly, one can
generalize the filtering results of Corollary 2 to the above models with B(i) = 0.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we have considered team games for distributed stochastic differential decision
systems, with decentralized noisy information patters for each DM, and we derived necessary and
sufficient optimality conditions with respect to team optimality and person-by-person optimality
criteria, based on Stochastic Pontryagin’s minimum principle.
However, several additional issues remain to be investigated. Below, we provide a short list.
(F1) In the derivation of optimality conditions we can relax some of the assumptions by
considering spike or needle variations instead of strong variations of the decision
strategies (or use relaxed strategies as in [2]). Moreover, for team games with non-
convex action spaces Ai, i = 1, 2, . . . , N and diffusion coefficients which depend on
the decision variables it is necessary to derive optimality conditions based on second-
order variations.
(F2) The derivation of optimality conditions can be used in other type of games such as
Nash-equilibrium games with decentralized noisy information structures for each DM,
and minimax games.
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(F3) It will be interesting determine whether (99) and (100) are given by the Kalman filter
equations.
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